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REINTERPRETING THE RELIGION CLAUSES:
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND
CONCEPTIONS OF THE SELF
The first amendment guarantees freedom from "law[s] respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."1
The apparent tension between the two clauses of this provision2 has
generated judicial confusion 3 and scholarly disagreement. 4 The per-
ceived conflict between the religion clauses is the product of a partic-
ular understanding of what is most fundamental about human identity
and the human situation - an understanding that derives from clas-
sical liberal political theory and that assumes a sharp division between
the individual and his community. This Note proposes an alternative
to the liberal conception of human identity, one that encompasses both
the separateness of the self and its connection to others. This under-
standing of the self can reveal a unified purpose underlying the clauses
and can explain the lingering tension within them as a manifestation
of their joint effort to maintain equilibrium between the two aspects
of the self. Analyzing this conception's implications not only betrays
the inadequacies of present theories and suggests a more coherent
interpretation of the existing doctrine; it also demonstrates that con-
stitutional construction rests on choices among various conceptions of
the self and of the relationship between the self and society.
I. PREVAILING THEORIES AND THE LIBERAL CONCEPTION OF THE
SELF
A. Three Prevailing Theories
Jurists have advanced three types of theories in response to the
conflict between the religion clauses. Each type is defined by its
emphasis on one of the three values traditionally associated with the
religion clauses: institutional separation, personal voluntarism, and
1 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Supreme Court has held that the religion clauses apply not
only to the federal government, but also to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, i5 (x947) (the establishment clause); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (the free exercise clause).
2 The Court has acknowledged the conflict between the religion clauses. See Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970) ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course
between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."). Scholars have
also recognized the conflict. See, e.g., Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment:
Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PiTT. L. REv. 673, 674 (1g8o); Schwarz, No Imposition of
Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 692 (1968).
3 See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671
(198o) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
4 See infra pp. 1469-70.
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governmental neutrality. Each theory is incomplete - each focuses
on only one value because it cannot accommodate the other, appar-
ently irreconcilable, values protected by the clauses. Paradoxically,
however, this perceived irreconcilability stems from a conception of
human identity shared by all three theories.
Separationist theorists5 interpret the establishment clause to require
a wall of separation between church and state. 6 This barrier protects
the "garden of the church" from the encroaching "wilderness of the
world" 7 and insulates the political process from the jealousy and
divisiveness caused by religious strife.8 But complete separation is
impossible in an interdependent society; government and religious
organizations continually act in ways that affect one another. Because
we cannot eliminate this interaction, we can only choose how much
and what kind of interaction there shall be. 9 Another difficulty with
separation is that it may require the sacrifice of neutrality and vol-
untarism, the values emphasized by the other theories. For example,
a scheme of educational funding that provided aid to parochial schools
might serve both neutrality and voluntarism. Nonetheless, the prin-
ciple of strict separation would prohibit such funding.' 0
Voluntarist theories embody the principle that lies at the heart of
most free exercise claims - the principle that a person should be free
5 For the Supreme Court's statement of the strict separation theory, see Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 15-x6 (1947) (upholding constitutionality of state-funded transportation
for children in parochial as well as public schools). Altough the aid at issue in Everson was
approved, the language of the opinion indicated that strict separation was the standard to be
used in evaluating the constitutionality of government aid to religious institutions. For argu-
ments supporting that standard, see Pfeffer, Church and State: Something Less Than Separation,
19 U. CHI. L. REv. I (1951); Pfeffer, Federal Funds for Parochial Schools? No., 37 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 309 (1962).
6 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge and Others, A Committee of the
Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, X802), reprinted in T. JEFFERSON, THE PORTABLE
THOMAS JEFFERSON 303, 303 (M. Peterson ed. 1975).
7 M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 5-6 (1965) (quoting P. MILLER, ROGER
WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION 89, 98 (1953)).
8 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-96
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (I97I); J. MADISON, A Memorial and
Remonstrance, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 8, 14 (M. Meyers ed. 1973); Freund, Public
Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 168o, 1692 (1969) ("[P]olitical division on religious
lines is one of the principal evils that the first amendment sought to forestall.").
9 See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II.
The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 548 (1968); Laycock, Towards a Theory
of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,
81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373, 1379 (1981).
10 See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 762-
67 (1973) (noting that challenged statutes applied equally to religious and nonreligious private
schools); id. at 788-89 (noting that "[the state's] program of tuition grants . . . [was] designed
to promote the free exercise of religion").
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from both constraint and compulsion in the exercise of his religion.' 1
The case for voluntarism is strongest when someone requests a reli-
gious exemption to a facially neutral law - for example, a school
attendance law. 12 The individual is not asking the government to
shape its policy according to his religious beliefs; he is simply request-
ing an exemption from requirements that he cannot in good conscience
fulfill. Such an exemption, however, threatens the separation of gov-
ernmental and religious authorities by encouraging the state to inves-
tigate the content of religious beliefs in order to determine whether
they warrant an exemption. Moreover, requiring the law to create
explicit exemptions based on religious categories compromises the gov-
ernment's neutrality. 13
Some theorists believe that the principle of governmental neutrality
can integrate both clauses. 14 Theories of neutrality call for the pro-
scription of government actions based on religious classifications; to
pass muster, distinctions that determine rights and responsibilities
must be neutral with respect to religion.' 5 But this putative recon-
ciliation of the clauses is illusory: neutrality is sometimes achieved at
the expense of both separation and voluntarism. For example, if a
church sought an exemption from a law regulating the use of alcoholic
beverages, neutrality would require the state either to regulate cere-
monial as well as nonceremonial uses of alcohol or to abandon the
regulation of alcohol altogether. If the state chose the former course,
both separation and voluntarism would suffer.
All of the prevailing theories suggest that, when the two religion
clauses conflict, one of the traditional values should prevail at the
expense of the others. Thus, these theories fail to comprehend both
11 Some writers contend that the free exercise clause limits the establishment clause because
the essence of the free exercise claim - that the government has violated the principle of
voluntarism - is a necessary part of every establishment claim. This reasoning ensures that
the establishment clause can never reach further than the free exercise clause does. See, e.g.,
Choper, supra note 2, at 675 (arguing that the establishment clause is violated only if the
government action "is likely to impair religious freedom by coercing, compromising, or influ-
encing religious beliefs").
12 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
13 For instance, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (x963), the Court required South Carolina
to exempt Sabbatarians from a state statute denying unemployment compensation to persons
who refused to work on Saturday. Such an exemption entangles church and state because it
forces the government to determine whether a particular claimant's objection is truly a religious
one. The exemption also sacrifices neutrality: "The State . . . must single out for financial
assistance those whose behavior is religiously motivated, even though it denies such assistance
to others whose identical behavior . . . is not religiously motivated." Id. at 422 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
14 See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part I.
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 8o HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1382 (1967).
15 See Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(I96i).
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the relationship among the values and the interdependence of the
clauses. This failure is rooted in the liberal conception of the self that
informs all three attempts to reconcile the clauses.
B. The Liberal Conception of the Self
The prevailing approaches to the religion clauses implicitly divide
the world into two spheres: public and private. The private sphere
is the locus of desire and belief, of irrationality and moral value, and
hence of religion. The public sphere is the locus of action - of
rational procedures for the attainment of defined goals. 16 This di-
chotomy superficially explains the purposes of the religion clauses: the
establishment clause keeps religion out of the public sphere, and the
free exercise clause protects religion within the private sphere. 17 To-
gether the clauses guard the integrity of both realms.
The demarcation of public and private spheres can be traced to a
particular understanding of the nature of the individual and his con-
nection to society. According to this theory of the self, on which
liberal political philosophy is grounded,' 8 an individual's identity is
completely defined before he enters society. Thus, he comes to any
group he may join as a fully formed self, prepared to choose the
desires, beliefs, and values that will be his ends.19 The liberal state,
whose legitimacy depends on the consent of its members, 20 must,
consequently, be rational and substantively neutral in order not to
prejudice the value choices of any of its members. 21 It must operate
only upon the external realm of action, not upon the internal realm
of belief. 2 2 The requirements of a consent-based society, in which
each individual self is completely defined before the group is formed,
thus entail the division between the public and private spheres.
The image of divided spheres of human experience is what gen-
erates the conflict between the religion clauses. Each clause aims to
protect the integrity of one sphere, but the two spheres inevitably
16 See Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1057, 1074-76 (ig8o).
17 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, i64 (1878) (holding that the effect of the first
amendment is to "deprivefl [Congress] of all legislative power over mere opinion, but [leave it]
free to reach actions").
18 Michael Sandel associates liberalism with a deontological (rights-based) ethic and argues
that deontology has a "transcendental subject" as its necessary foundation. See M. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 1-7 (1982). Deontology is a theme common to the
otherwise diverse collection of theories often labeled "liberal."
19 See id. at 19, 133.
20 See T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 228-29 (C. Macpherson ed. 1968) (ist ed. London 1651); J.
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 54 (T. Peardon ed. 1952) (1st ed. London
i6go); Wolff, Beyond Tolerance, in R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE, A CRITIQUE OF
PURE TOLERANCE 3, 5 (2d ed. 1969).
21 See M. SANDEL, supra note i8, at 9 (liberalism holds that "[s]ociety is best ... governed
by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good, for any other
arrangement would fail to respect persons as beings capable of choice").
22 See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 141-42 (G. Himmelfarb ed. 1974) (ist ed. London 1859).
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collide. The private sphere may invade the public sphere through
public practice of religion, 23 proselytizaton, 24 or requests for exemp-
tions from generally applicable rules. 25 If the public sphere acquiesced
to religious demands, it would relinquish its claim to substantive
neutrality: the state would be barred from processing religious and
nonreligious desires in the same way and instead would be required
to accommodate the special needs of religious believers explicitly. If,
to the contrary, the public sphere steeled itself against religious infil-
tration, the private sphere would be impoverished: it would be left
without the means to enforce the guarantee of religious freedom in
the face of governmental intransigence. 26
The separationist, voluntarist, and neutrality theories all attempt
to resolve the conflict between the public and private spheres. Sep-
arationist theories sacrifice the vitality of the private sphere to the
integrity of the public sphere by denying public support for religious
practices. Voluntarist theories yield the opposite result. Neutrality
theories, finally, propose to mediate between the two spheres by mea-
suring state action against a formal, procedural standard, This pro-
cedural solution, however, may result in the sacrifice of the substantive
values of separation and voluntarism on which the integrity of both
spheres depends. 27 The attempt to maintain an untenable division
between two interdependent aspects of experience is the result of an
individualistic, liberal conception of the self. Because the prevailing
theories share this conception, none of them can resolve the conflict
between the clauses without impinging upon one or both of the
spheres.
II. AN ALTERNATE CONCEPTION OF THE SELF
The self can be conceived in another way. It may be viewed not
as a subject with predetermined boundaries, but as the fulcrum of a
dynamic equilibrium between two competing yet complementary as-
pects of human identity: separation from and connection to other
human beings. When interpreted in light of this conception, the
religion clauses take on a new meaning: their purpose is to strike a
balance between these two aspects of the self. The values of sepa-
23 See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting state-sponsored prayer
in public schools).
24 See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down license tax as
applied to distributors of religious literature).
25 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that state must exempt
Sabbatarians from requirement that recipients of unemployment compensation be available for
work on Saturday).
26 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. 205 (1972), for example, the Court noted that expert
testimony had been offered to prove that "compulsory high school attendance could . . .
ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community." Id. at 212.
27 See supra pp. 1469-70.
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ration, neutrality, and voluntarism are the means by which that bal-
ance is maintained. The resulting social structure is characterized not
by the collision of two purportedly distinct spheres, but by a social
commitment to plurality and choice that fosters a network of richly
interwoven communities.
The self has a dual nature. In an important sense, each individual
has a separate, unique identity.28 Our perception of this separateness
may be due in part to the simple biological fact that each of us is a
separate organism. 29 Another source of this perception is our expe-
rience of making choices. 30 In the process of choosing for ourselves,
creating ourselves, each of us defines the boundary between self and
others and gives it psychological and moral significance. This bound-
ary establishes the individual's separate identity.
Collective identity is another essential part of the personality. 3'
Human beings belong to socially and biologically defined groups -
families, neighborhoods, ethnic groups - that determine not just
what we want, but also who we are.32 Our consciousness of these
connections, our sense of belonging, constitutes collective identity.
Through self-reflection, each of us participates in our connections to
these communities, not by choosing or creating the connections, but
by discovering and acknowledging them. 33
Although the separate and collective aspects of the self are in some
sense opposed, they are not hostile to one another. Rather, like the
subject and background in a painting, they are mutually defining.
Collective identity presupposes separate identity, in the form of the
28 The separation of self and other is a basic assumption of the classical liberal political
tradition. See, e.g., J. LOCKE, supra note 2o, at 54-55 (society is created through a social
contract among separate individuals). For a modern version of social contract theory, see J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
29 Cf. R. NozICK, ANAJRCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 33 (1974) ("There are only individual
people, different individual people, with their own individual lives.").
30 See M. SANDEL, supra note 18, at 58-59 (discussing the relation between choice and the
antecedently defined self).
31 Many philosophers have recognized the collective aspect of identity. See, e.g., G. HEGEL,
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 156 (T. Knox trans. 1979) ("[I]t is only as one of [the state's] members
that the individual himself has objectivity, genuine individuality, and an ethical life."); K.
MARX, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, in KARL MARX: SELECTED WRITINGS 75,
81-84, 9O-9! (D. McLellan ed. 1977) (discussing "species being" and the possibility of its
destruction through alienation); J. ROUSSEAU, The Social Contract, in THE ESSENTIAL Rous-
SEAU 1, 18-2o, 87-89 (L. Bair trans. 1974) (the "general will" allows for both order and freedom
in a commonwealth).
32 See J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY io8-o9 (T.
McCarthy trans. 1979); cf. M. SANDEL, supra note 18, at i5o (the "constitutive conception" of
community defines "not just what [members] have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not
a relationship they choose . . . but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a
constituent of their identity"); Wolff, supra note 2o, at 18 ("Put simply, the idea is that the
human personality, in its development, structure, and continued functioning is dependent upon
the social group of which it is a significant member.").
33 See M. SANDEL, supra note 18, at 152-53.
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individual's consciousness of his relation to the group; for there to be
a "we," there must be an "I.3'34 Similarly, the foundations of separate
identity - self-knowledge, self-respect, and self-expression - depend
for their very existence upon the individual's membership in a cultural
and linguistic community. 35 Thus, the two facets of identity are not
only consistent, but are interdependent as well.36
The religion clauses protect each of the two processes that create
this dual self. The first process through which identity emerges is the
process of choice. Choices that determine the individual's separate
identity and define his connection to other human beings are protected
by the free exercise clause. In order for choice to be effective, how-
ever, background social institutions must allow for the formation of
both aspects of the self. Each community must be free to create a
collective identity, but no community should be so overpowering that
it threatens the individual's ability to define himself in opposition to
it. The establishment clause protects this second process, through
which an individual's identity is formed by the influence of commu-
nities. The clause ensures the right of both religious and political
communities to influence identity independently, but it protects the
individual from the potentially overwhelming power of their alliance.
The two religion clauses thus protect the processes by which sociali-
zation and individual choice together shape the contours of human
identity.
Individuals are influenced by a wide range of constitutionally pro-
tected communities, of which religious groups are only one. 37 But the
special constitutional protection for religion is more than just an his-
torical accident. Defined functionally, a religion is a system of belief
that is essential to the self-definition of the believer. 38 Thus, a society
that failed to protect religion would foreclose the individual's choice
of the most fundamental part of his identity.
When a religious conflict arises between the individual and the
state, an interpretation of the religion clauses guided by a balanced
conception of the self would not lead to the collision of opposing
spheres. Instead, the conflict would take the form of a boundary
dispute between the political and religious communities, each of which
plays a role in both the "public" and "private" spheres, and each of
which claims the right to influence the individual's identity. The
34 See Karst, Individuality, Community, and Law, in LAW AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE
68, 74 (M. Schwartz ed. 1976).
35 See id. at 75.
36 Cf. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 685,
1713-22 (1976) (discussing the interdependence of individualism and altruism).
37 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (x958) (holding that the
Constitution protects freedom of association and associational privacy); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 5Io (.925) (holding that the Constitution protects the right of parents to guide
the upbringing of their children).
3' See infra pp. 1477-78.
1474 [Vol. 97:1468
RELIGION CLAUSES
settlement of such a dispute must be guided by the overriding goal of
the religion clauses: the protection of both separate and collective
identities.
III. THE RELIGION CLAUSES
This interpretation of the religion clauses does not require a radical
reconstruction of doctrine. The themes of voluntarism, neutrality, and
separation that infuse existing doctrine are not merely unsalvageable
products of classical liberalism's misconception of the self; they can
be reconceived as the instruments through which choice and plurality
enable the self to develop both separate and collective aspects. The
free exercise clause protects the individual's choice of his identity, and
the establishment clause protects the pluralistic structure of the back-
ground social institutions necessary to make that choice both possible
and meaningful.
A. The Free Exercise Clause
Through their choices to connect or to separate themselves, indi-
viduals define their identities. The free exercise clause protects their
choice of religious belief. For this protection to be effective, a defi-
nition of religion for free exercise purposes must emphasize religion's
role in the formation of identity. The free exercise clause must also
ensure that any impairment of this role is limited and justified. Thus
construed, the free exercise clause serves as a safeguard against the
government's invasion of the process through which the individual
creates a separate or collective self.
i. The Definition of Religion.39 - Several prominent definitions
of religion in the free exercise context share common characteristics
that can best be understood in light of the suggested reinterpretation
of the religion clauses. These definitions are all functional, 40 and all
characterize the function similarly. This approach to defining religion
promotes the value of voluntarism by guaranteeing that the free ex-
ercise clause will protect individual choice.
In order to serve the free exercise clause's purpose of protecting
the individual's choice of his identity, religion must be defined in
terms of the formation of identity, not the content of belief. Content-
based definitions of religion contradict the very constitutional require-
ment that they were intended to clarify; whether such definitions focus
39 This definition is offered only for free exercise purposes. A different but related definition
is discussed in the section on the establishment clause. See infra p. 1485.
40 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, i65-66 (1965); Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REV. io56, 1072-75 (1978). But see Choper, Defining
"Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579, 594-97 (rejecting a functional
definition of religion).
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on particular beliefs or only on broad classes of concerns, they limit
the range of choice that the clause was intended to protect. Such
constraints on choice directly conflict with the value of voluntarism:
"They enshrine an orthodoxy within a Constitution designed in part
to protect unorthodoxy. '' 4 1 Any definition of religion should therefore
be functional rather than substantive. 42
Courts and scholars have consistently recognized two elements of
a functional definition of religion. First, religious belief must have a
normative component - it must morally oblige the individual to act
in certain ways.43 Government, even when aiming to influence belief,
operates by regulating action. 44 Hence religious belief must govern
action in order to generate the conflict with the state that raises a free
exercise claim. Moreover, the belief that gives rise to the action must
be a moral one. Beliefs resting "solely upon considerations of policy,
41 Note, supra note 40, at 1074-75.
42 There is also a practical reason for a functional definition: it is unlikely that any content-
based definition could encompass all of the belief systems that people would generally concede
to be religions. See id. at 1072-74. Further, the particular functional definition discussed here
does not require that religious beliefs be shared by a group. Although for many people, religion
does connote strong communal ties, see M. WALZER, OBLIGATIONS 5 (x970); Laycock, supra
note 9, at 1389, the free exercise clause must protect beliefs that separate the individual as well
as those that connect him; otherwise, the clause would disturb the balance between the two
aspects of human identity. Yet by not requiring communal belief, the functional definition does
not leave religious groups unprotected. The free exercise clause must shelter church autonomy
because "[w]hen the state interferes with the autonomy of a church . . . it interferes with the
very process of forming the religion as it will exist in the future." Id. at 1391. To take this
process out of the church's hands is also to take it out of the hands of the individual who has
chosen to define himself as a church member. Thus, protecting the autonomy of the church is
essential to the free exercise clause's larger task: protecting the individual's freedom to shape
his identity.
43 See Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion
Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 8o5, 831 (1978); Note, Religious Exemptions
Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 90 YALE L.J. 350, 363
(198o) [hereinafter cited as Note, Religious Exemptions]. One might object to the inclusion of
a normative component in the definition of religion on the ground that "[a] number of beliefs
- including the Greco-Oriental mystery cults, for example - offer no moral or ethical principles
to guide their adherents, but few would argue that their attempt to put their believers in contact
with the Ultimate is not religious." Note, supra note 40, at 1073 (footnote omitted). The
existence of such amoral cults raises no difficulties for a norm-centered definition of religion for
free exercise purposes. If a system of belief, which in other contexts we want to call religious,
has no implications for behavior, it should never conflict with the demands of the state, which
always pertain to the control of behavior. The only religious beliefs with which the free exercise
clause need be concerned are those that influence action.
44 Because belief and action are integrated stages in a single process of identity formation,
the separation of the two undermines the entire process. When the establishment clause is at
issue, the continuity between belief and action compels us to acknowledge the government's
right to influence nonreligious belief. See infra p. 1484. When a free exercise claim arises, the
inseparability of belief and action requires us to admit that religious action, as well as belief,
may be protected from government interference. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220
(1972).
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pragmatism, or expediency" 4 5 are unrelated to the individual's choice
of identity - the choice that the free exercise clause protects.
Second, to qualify as a religion, a system of belief must be fun-
damental to the believer's identity - it must have' an element of
compulsion that justifies the protection it receives. 4 6 Religion has been
described as an "ultimate concern, ' ' 4 7 as "a unified belief system that
cuts across and directs more than a single aspect of an individual's
life," 4 8 and as "a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which
all else is ultimately dependent."' 4 9 These descriptions recognize that
"the concerns of any individual can be ranked, and that if we probe
deeply enough, we will discover the underlying concern which gives
meaning and orientation to a person's whole life." °5 0 To acquiesce in
a demand that violates this underlying concern, the individual would
have to compromise himself dramatically; the "I" that exists could not
obey the state's command and remain intact.5l This core of belief
defines religion for the purposes of the free exercise clause;5 2 as the
45 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1970) (plurality opinion of Black, J.); see
Yoder, 4o6 U.S. at 216. The Welsh case dealt with statutory religious exemptions from the
draft. Some have argued that, if such exemptions do not include all who would qualify under
the free exercise clause, they raise not only free exercise problems, but also problems under the
establishment and equal protection clauses by exempting some religious beliefs and not others.
See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 38o U.S. 163, 188 (2965) (Douglas, J., concurring); cf.
Greenawalt, All or Nothing at All: The Defeat of Selective Conscientious Objection, 1971 SuP.
CT. REV. 31, 39 (arguing that the Seeger test has "strong constitutional overtones").
46 A different kind of compulsion, that exerted by religious authority, has also been thought
to justify religious exemptions. The individual who chooses to obey such commands of con-
science has not put himself beyond the reach of authority, but has only subjected himself to the
dictates of another - nonpolitical - authority. See generally Note, Religious Exemptions,
supra note 43 (discussing a conflict-of-laws model that recognizes the competing spheres of
authority).
47 Note, supra note 40, at 1O66 (quoting P. TILLICH, DYNAMIcS OF FAITH, 1-2 (1957)).
The Note offers this definition for free exercise purposes only. For the Note's definition of
religion for purposes of the establishment clause, see id. at 1083-89.
48 Merel, supra note 43, at 831 (footnote omitted).
49 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
50 Note, supra note 40, at IO67. This view derives from the work of Paul Tillich. See P.
TILLICH, supra note 47, at 1-29; P. TILLICH, THE PROTESTANT ERA 58-59, 87-88 (1948).
S This dilemma of the self is captured eloquently by Martin Luther's famous response at
the Diet of Worms: "'Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise."' R. BAINTON, HERE I STAND: A
LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER 185 (1950) (quoting Martin Luther).
52 Cases involving powerful, insular religious communities may appear to belie this assertion:
if the state does not intervene, members of such communities might well lack meaningful freedom
to choose the intellectual, moral, and spiritual content of their lives. But even in such cases,
nonintervention is the best way to preserve the individual's options. The background presence
of the larger political community will demonstrate to the group's members that alternatives to
the narrow religious community are available. If the state intervenes in order to ensure more
than this minimum freedom, it may impair the religious community's ability to function. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 212 (1972). Only if government exercises extreme self-
restraint can the religious community remain intact; and only if both the religious community
and the broader political community are allowed to flourish will the individual have the ability
to choose his own identity.
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individual's belief approaches this fundamental core,5 3 the protection
afforded by the free exercise clause approaches its fullest measure.5 4
2. Government Action Prohibiting the Free Exercise of Religion.
The individual's freedom to choose his identity does not, however,
entitle him to override the government in every case in which a
fundamental belief is at stake. If every government action that some-
how affected religious practice were taken to "prohibit" free exercise
within the meaning of the first amendment, the government would be
crippled, incapable of fulfilling its other constitutional obligations.
The boundary of permissible state action must therefore be determined
by the effect such action has on the individual's choice of identity.5 5
When state action deprives the individual of full membership in
the political community because of his choice of a particular religious
affiliation, the state interferes with free exercise. The individual's
choice of identity can be protected only if the political community
offers him full membership regardless of his association with a reli-
gious community. Actions that merely make it less convenient to
choose a particular religious identity do not violate the free exercise
clause: they do not bring the membership requirements of the two
communities into conflict. But government actions that condition a
legal right, privilege, or duty of citizenship upon a certain choice of
religious identity do prohibit free exercise, because legal rights and
duties define full membership in the political community.5 6
53 Although it may seem intrusive and unrealistic to require the Court to determine the
importance of the belief to the believer, such a requirement is part of the standard analysis of
conscientious objectors' claims. See United States v. Seeger, 38o U.S. 163, 183-84 (1965).
S4 When the belief is essential to the believer's identity, the state should be required to
advance a compelling interest to justify any interference with it.
55 State action explicitly motivated by the desire to limit religious freedom is clearly invalid
under the establishment clause, see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (x968), especially
if the government's policy or practice favors some religions over others, see Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982). This Section deals with the more difficult class of cases in which
the government's interference serves a legitimate state purpose.
56 Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4322 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.").
To analyze a free exercise claim, a court must determine whether the individual, if he persists
in his religious practices, will lose something that he would otherwise be entitled to. For
example, in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (I961), the Court upheld a Sunday closing law
against a free exercise challenge by Jewish businessmen who suffered a financial loss because
their religion required them to close on Saturday as well. The underlying issue in Braunfeld
was whether the right to work at the employment of one's choice is a right in the strong sense
that it is an essential feature of membership in the political community. If it is, Braunfeld was
wrongly decided. But if it is not, the plaintiffs lacked a free exercise claim: if they chose to
practice their religion, they would suffer only a loss of convenience and not the loss of a right
or entitlement guaranteed to members of the political community. If, however, the state chose
to limit unemployment compensation in a way that disqualified Sabbatarians because they would
not work on Saturday, see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), they would have a valid
free exercise claim because they would otherwise have a prima facie entitlement to the compen-
sation.
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3. Compelling State Ends. - Even government actions that force
the individual to choose between political and religious identities do
not necessarily violate the free exercise clause. The government may
justify its coercion by pointing to a compelling state end that cannot
be achieved through a less restrictive means. 57 A compelling end is
one that is fundamental to the legitimacy of the political community
in the same sense that religious belief is fundamental to the identity
of the individual. The community's self-image sets the terms for its
own legitimacy; it must be able to enforce fundamental requirements
of membership in order to meet those terms.
Certain elements of citizenship are fundamental to most political
communities; others are unique to specific political forms. Most gov-
ernments base their legitimacy on the claim that they improve people's
opportunities to lead productive and satisfying lives. Essential to the
credibility of this claim is the government's ability to protect its citi-
zens from violent attack. A government unable to extend this protec-
tion is unlikely to enjoy political legitimacy. 58 Thus, the requirement
that citizens refrain from violence toward each other serves a "com-
pelling state end" and must be upheld against a free exercise challenge.
Certain kinds of social welfare legislation - health codes, for instance
- may also be indispensable to a state's claim to legitimacy. In
addition, a democracy may support its legitimacy by reference to other
goals - for example, political equality. A democracy that perpetuates
political inequality undermines its own legitimacy; thus, restrictions
on religious exercise are permissible if they are essential to maintaining
political equality.59
When free exercise threatens the legitimacy of the political com-
munity, it jeopardizes the institutional structure necessary to protect
the very autonomy that the individual is asserting. Thus, the state's
compelling end is not an independent value to which free exercise is
sacrificed; its end is, instead, the preservation of the pluralistic social
structure that makes the free exercise of religion possible. The state's
end, in other words, is the fulfillment of its obligations under the
establishment clause.
B. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause requires that social institutions be struc-
tured in a way that allows for the formation of both the separate and
collective aspects of the self. Each of the two major themes of estab-
57 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164-68 (1879) (upholding Mormon's
conviction for polygamy because of state's interest in preserving family and social structure).
58 Cf. M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION i56 (A. Hen-
derson & T. Parsons trans. 1947) (the monopoly of force is essential to the state).
59 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (upholding federal govern-
ment's refusal to subsidize racially discriminatory schools through tax exemptions).
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lishment clause theory - separation and neutrality - can be associ-
ated with a certain kind of plurality. Separation creates plurality by
distinguishing political and religious communities; neutrality creates
plurality by encouraging the development of diverse religious com-
munities. Reinterpreted in light of this understanding of plurality,
existing doctrine can provide the foundation for collective identity as
well as the space for individual separateness.
i. Neutrality. - The Supreme Court's current establishment clause
test, announced in 1971 in Lemon v. Kurtzman,60 crystallizes the
theme of neutrality into doctrine. The first prong of the Lemon test
requires that state action have a secular purpose, 6 1 one that aims
neither to advance nor to inhibit religion. 62 In other words, the
purpose must be neutral with respect to both particular religions and
religion in general. 6 3
Such neutrality fosters horizontal plurality - that is, it fosters a
society in which a multiplicity of communities that exert a particular
kind of influence (for example, religious influence) can coexist. 64 Of
course, neutrality cannot guarantee plurality; all the citizens of a
homogeneous society might belong to the same religious group despite
their government's studied neutrality. But neutrality does ensure that
the comparative vitality of the competing communities to which people
are exposed will depend on the popular appeal of the ideas they offer 6 5
and not on the government's preferences. Only the state's neutrality
in this regard can protect the possibility of horizontal plurality.
Plurality supplies a basis for the formation of both collective and
separate identity. Membership in a community can determine one's
identity in fundamental ways even if one remains unaware of the
community's influence. The collective self, however, is premised on
the individual's awareness of the collective aspect of his identity.
Plurality provides a contrast among communities that allows members
not only to acquire distinctive group characteristics, but also to rec-
ognize that those characteristics are theirs by virtue of their member-
ship in the group. The contrast among communities also apprises the
60 See 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (I97I). Recent Supreme Court opinions indicate that the Court
may soon abandon this test. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 52 U.S.L.W. 4317, 4320 (U.S, Mar.
5, 1984).
61 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
62 See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (applying the standard that later
became the first prong of the Lemon test).
63 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 716 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. i, i5 (I947).
64 The social structure of the United States exemplifies such horizontal plurality. See L.
PFEFFER, CREEDS IN COMPETITION: A CREATIVE FORCE IN AMERICAN CULTURE 82 (1958).
65 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 3o6, 313 (1952) (describing "an attitude on the part of
government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each [religion] flourish
according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma"); Gianella, supra note 9, at
517.
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individual of the possibility of separating himself from any given
group. Thus, horizontal plurality aids in the formation of both the
collective and separate aspects of identity.
2. Separation of Church and State. - The separation of church
and state - the second theme in establishment clause doctrine -
promotes vertical plurality. Vertical plurality refers to the simulta-
neous influence of several communities upon an individual whom they
all claim as a member. Modern society is full of overlapping com-
munities; an individual may belong to a family, a neighborhood, an
ethnic group, a church and a nation. Two of these intersecting com-
munities - church and state - are kept distinct by the doctrine of
separation. Each of these two operates in both the public sphere
(action and reason) and the private sphere (belief and emotion) of the
old liberal model. Hence both communities are capable of influencing
the formation of the self.
The competition of secular and sacred communities ensures bal-
ance between the separate and collective aspects of the self. Plurality
prevents the overwhelming influence of a monolithic community from
destroying separateness: "the historical rivalry between Church and
State is ... a precious guarantee of freedom, sheltering the conscience
of the individual against the dangers of a too great concentration of
power." 6 6 Vertical plurality also provides a basis for collective iden-
tity; the contrast among groups makes us aware of the extent of our
membership in each as well as the extent of our separateness. 6 7
66 G. DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM 406 (R. Collingwood trans.
r927). But see J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 31, at iio ("Anything that breaks social unity is
worthless. All institutions that place man in contradiction with himself are worthless.").
67 The effect of vertical plurality on the individual's ability to separate himself from others
has been obliquely recognized by those who accuse existing establishment clause doctrine of
creating a "religion of secularism." See, e.g., Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 31 (1949). The Supreme Court rejected this argument, at least in regard
to prayer in the public schools. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963).
Some scholars have labeled the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause "secular"
because they believe that the Court's position - that "religion could not by law be made a
concern of the commonwealth as such, deserving in any degree of public recognition or aid" -
is based upon "the essentially theological reason that religion is of its nature a personal, private,
interior matter of the individual conscience." Murray, supra, at 29 (footnote omitted). Simply
by refusing to establish a religion, the argument goes, the government takes a stand on a
controversial point of theological dogma. See id. at 31. As one historian has written:
[The state] is taking its stand on the assertion that the individual conscience is able by
itself to achieve a religious view of life, and can manifest its sense of the divine in all
its purity only in a spontaneous and autonomous manner. It is too often forgotten, when
the doctrine of the Liberal State is crystallized into a dogma, that it really consists in
freedom, and that its source lies therefore in the individual.
G. DE RUGGIERO, supra note 66, at 404-05.
To the extent that any conception of the person is fundamentally theological, these criticisms
are valid but trivial. The state must operate upon some conception of the individual; the
establishment clause could not reasonably be construed to prohibit a secular one. Moreover,
although the government's enforcement of the separation of church and state does indeed
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Current establishment clause doctrine, as stated in Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,68 requires two kinds of separation. First, the state must not
excessively entangle itself with religious institutions. 69 Second, the
state's actions must not have the primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion. 70 These two prohibitions rule out two different
kinds of interaction between church and state. The first kind occurs
when church and state become intertwined in managing an area in
which both have a legitimate interest. Joint administration of edu-
cational or social services exemplifies such entanglement. The second
kind of interaction occurs when the state - with or without the
assistance of a religious institution - becomes involved in an essen-
tially religious endeavor. Prayer in the public schools is an instance
of such state-sponsored religious activity. Both kinds of interaction
potentially threaten the vertical plurality that separation of church
and state was designed to achieve.
In considering entanglements, courts must determine how far
church and state may cooperate in pursuit of common ends. 71 Judges
should answer this question by examining the effect of particular
entanglements on vertical plurality, the objective of separation doc-
trine. Vertical plurality preserves individual autonomy by maintaining
a balance between two powerful institutions - a balance reminiscent
of those maintained both by federalism and by the separation of
powers within the federal government. 72 Entanglement threatens this
balance by bringing church and state into such close cooperation that
they can no longer act as checks upon each other. When entanglement
becomes an impediment to vertical plurality, it violates the establish-
ment clause. 73
"establish" a doctrine, the doctrine is miscast as a "theological" one: it is not fundamentally a
theory about religion, but one about individual identity. An individual's identity is defined by
his separation from the group as well as his connection to it. The separation doctrine allows
private groups to establish the communal and educational institutions necessary to the promotion
of religion as a collective enterprise, but the doctrine's protection of vertical plurality also
preserves the individual's separateness. If the denial of this separateness is part of the church's
dogma, the doctrine of separation surely conflicts with it; but there can be no neutrality on this
point.
68 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
69 See id. at 612-13.
70 See id.
71 The establishment clause permits some minimal cooperation between church and state.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("Of course, cutting off church schools
from [fire and police] services, so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious
function, would make it far more difficult for the schools to operate. But such is obviously not
the purpose of the First Amendment.").
72 See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 229 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
73 Entanglement problems often arise in the context of state aid to religious educational
institutions. The Supreme Court has tended to approve such aid only when administering the
funds would not require extensive government supervision. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 619 (1971) (striking down state plan to reimburse religious schools for teachers' salaries
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Yet vertical plurality may also be impeded by a lack of cooperation
between church and state. In areas of social life in which government-
supported competition has become commonplace, religion's influence
may be extinguished if no state aid is forthcoming. 74 When govern-
mental inaction would so threaten religion, "[tihe very concept of
separation ... requires that the state establish conditions under which
the church can act as an autonomous unit in the social order." 75
Because the wall of separation should preserve two distinct sources
of influence on the individual, any attempt by the state either to
combine the influence of government and religion or to displace reli-
gious influence is a threat to the plurality protected by the establish-
ment clause.
Separation is also threatened when the government advances or
inhibits religion. 76 The establishment clause has put certain activities
beyond the power of government; the traditional wisdom has it that
the distinction between action and belief marks this boundary. 7 7 As
the Supreme Court declared in West Virginia State Board of Educa-
tion v. Barnette,78 "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein." ' 79 The holding in Barnette certainly stands for the second
half of this proposition: the Court found that school children could
in part because it would require "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveil-
lance . . . to ensure that . . . the First Amendment . . . [is] respected"), with Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (i971) (upholding federal construction grants to sectarian uni-
versities in part because the grants involved "no continuing financial relationships or dependen-
cies, no annual audits, and no government analysis of an institution's expenditures on secular
as distinguished from religious activities"). The danger of entanglement lies in the possibility
that the regulated religious institution might "capture" the state, much as regulated industries
may "capture" governmental agencies assigned to oversee them. "Capture" would reduce the
state's ability to exert a distinct influence and would thereby threaten vertical plurality.
74 "To withhold studiously from religious groups all benefits flowing from governmental
structuring of the social order will not only result in deprivations not demanded by the purposes
of nonestablishment but in some cases will actually frustrate them." Giannella, supra note 9,
at 515; cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (holding that the refusal to adjust
school schedules to meet students' religious needs "prefer[s] those who believe in no religion
over those who do believe"); Morgan, The Establishment Clause and Sectarian Schools: A Final
Installnent?, 1973 SuP. CT. REv. 57, 59 (observing that Catholic educators believe state aid is
essential to the survival of their schools).
75 Giannella, supra note 9, at 536.
76 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
77.See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
78 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
79 Id. at 642. Justice Frankfurter maintained in dissent that the flag salute was conduct,
see id. at 662 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), but the salute is actually a gesture of belief whose
only value to the state lies in its symbolism. A law requiring the flag salute is precisely the
kind of law that the belief/action distinction, if taken seriously, would prevent.
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not be coerced into saluting the flag.80 But the first half of the
proposition is a mere dictum, which the Barnette decision itself con-
tradicts. 81
Unlike prayer in public schools, which the Court later banned as
a violation of the establishment clause, the flag salute ceremony at
issue in Barnette was deemed constitutional as long as those who
found it unacceptable were exempted from participation. "Why? Be-
cause the prevailing, dominant view of religion classifies the flag salute
as secular, in contravention of the heterodox definition devoutly held
by the Witnesses." 8 2 Barnette thus makes clear that the wall between
church and state stands not on the line between action and belief, but
rather on the line between religion and politics. The state may not
coerce belief, yet it may inculcate political belief through voluntary
ceremonies such as the flag salute. Religious belief, on the other hand,
may not be promoted by the state even through voluntary exercises.83
The theory of dual identity explains why the dividing line between
church and state must trace the boundary between politics and reli-
gion, not the distinction between belief and action. If the division is
to maintain the vertical plurality essential to the protection of separate
identity, the political community must be free to create a civic
identity84 - that is, to shape belief. Beliefs are part of the substance
of identity; they are among the things that either bind us to a group
or separate us from it. The wall between church and state can create
vertical plurality only if both institutions are free to influence belief,
and, thereby, to shape identity.
The prohibitions of state entanglement with religion and of state
advancement of religion are both necessary to achieve vertical plural-
ity. Nonentanglement alone would be insufficient to protect vertical
plurality, if the respective spheres of influence of church and state
were not kept separate. If the state, with its enormous power and
resources, could compete with other private communities over every
element of identity, it would become a threat to vertical plurality.
85
In order both to allow the state to shape identity and to preserve a
sphere for private influence, the establishment clause prohibits the
80 Id. at 642.
81 See Schwarz, supra note 2, at 697; Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565,
567-68 (ig8o); Yudof, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression
and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REv. 863, 891 0979).
82 Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. x68o, x686 (x969).
83 See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 430 (1962).
84 See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); Illinois ex rel. Mc-
Collum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216-17, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); West
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 654 (I943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("[Ain
act promoting good citizenship and national allegiance is within the domain of governmental
authority."); Giannella, supra note 9, at 562.
85 See Shiffrin, supra note 8i, at 655.
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state from influencing religious belief.8 6 Although the political com-
munity may noncoercively shape a civic identity for its citizens,8 7 it
may not exercise its influence over all elements of identity; a sphere
of influence must be reserved for religion as well.
3. The Establishment Clause Definition of Religion. - How, then,
is the state to know when it has entered the forbidden realm of
religion? For purposes of the establishment clause, religion should be
defined by social consensus. When the government interferes with
beliefs or activities generally believed to be religious, it oversteps the
bounds of its constitutional authority.
This consensus-based definition is in harmony with the functional
definition discussed in the free exercise context. 88 Although the func-
tional definition avoids any inquiry into the content of belief, it en-
compasses only those beliefs that are fundamental to the identity of
the believer. 89 By ensuring plurality, the consensus-based definition
likewise preserves private influence over the sphere of fundamental
belief.90
Defining religion by social consensus for purposes of the establish-
ment clause protects plurality without crippling the government. The
fundamental concerns of the majority are placed beyond the influence
of the state, and the minority is still protected by the free exercise
clause, which provides an exemption from the law but does not in-
validate it.91 Moreover, the definition guarantees that the major re-
ligious institutions that shape the consensus and provide the basis for
vertical plurality will enjoy a sphere of influence free from government
interference. In short, the establishment clause preserves the plural-
istic social structure essential to the formation of both the separate
and collective aspects of identity.
86 The belief/action distinction, although it does not mark the boundary of the state's power
to influence, does define the limit of the state's power to coerce. See supra pp. 1483-84.
87 Of course, the Court has recognized that even when the individual's participation in
government-sponsored exercises is completely "voluntary," some compulsion inheres in such
exercises. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 208 n.3 (1963); Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Thus, to the extent
that the state's encouragement of public displays of belief is inherently coercive, the government
may legitimately use coercive means to inculcate "political" beliefs. But it may not, as Barnette
held, apply official sanctions against those who choose not to participate.
8 See supra pp. 1475-78.
89 See supra pp. 1477-78.
9o Not all idiosyncratic beliefs - even if fundamental - will fall within the consensus-based
definition of religion. This Note assumes only that any religion that falls within that definition
will also fall within the free exercise definition: it will belong to the class of beliefs that are
fundamental to the identity of the believer. It is in this sense that the establishment clause
definition of religion is in harmony with the free exercise definition.
91 See, e.g., West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (I943).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Any interpretation of the religion clauses of the first amendment,
or indeed of the Constitution in general, rests ultimately upon a vision
of the self and of society. In the past, judges have, perhaps subcon-
sciously, based their interpretation of these clauses on the liberal
conception of the individualistic self. As a result, the clauses seemed
irreconcilable; they were conceived as the guardians of mutually ex-
clusive yet inevitably conflicting realms. But the liberal conception
of the self need not constrain constitutional interpretation; there is an
alternate conception of the self that reaffirms the fundamental impor-
tance of community as well as that of individuality. An interpretation
guided by this synthetic conception merges the two clauses into a
unified guarantee of protection for both aspects of the self. The
religion clauses, by mandating a social commitment to plurality and
choice, protect the formation of the separate and collective aspects of
identity. Government must share its influence over the individual's
identity both with various other communities and with the individual
himself. The political community must be willing to accept - to the
limits of its legitimacy - the individual's commitment to other iden-
tities.
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